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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
ALAN J. DAVIS, Special 
Administrator of the Estate 
of SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE OF OHIO 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR 64571 
JUDGE RONALD SUSTER 
REPLY OF STATE OF OHIO 
"' 
The State of Ohio, by and through counsel Stephanie Tubbs 
Jones, Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County, and Marilyn 
Cassidy, Assist~nt Prosecuting Attorney for its reply to petitioner 
response, sets forth the within case authority. This authority 
supports the proposition that an action for wrongful incarceration 
is a civil action requiring that a civil action be commenced with 
the filing of a complaint. 
"An action for wrongful imprisonment cannot be brought by 
filing a motion for a determination of wrongful imprisonment in the 
criminal case in which the conviction occurred. An action brought 
pursuant to O.R.C. §2743.48 and O.R.C. §2305.02 for wrongful 
imprisonment is a civil action. (Civil Rule 3 (A) requires that a 
civil action be commenced with the filing of a complaint." State 
of Ohio v. Neil S. Jackson, 1994 Ohio App. Lexis 1737 (April 20, 
• 
1994). See also, State of Ohio v. Larry Smith 1989 Ohio App. Lexis 
2019 (9th Appellate District) which states that O.R.C . §2305.02 and 
O.R.C. §2743.48 must be read in pari materia because they present 
the statutory process through which an individual must progress 
before he can recover monetarily: 
"The statute in conjunction with O.R.C. 
§2743.48 does more than imbue the court with 
jurisdiction to hear and determine an action 
or proceeding. The phrase hear and determine 
relates to the function of the court to try 
and to decide all questions involved in a 
controversy presented to the court . 
The word 'action' as used in the statute has a 
specific statutory definition. O.R.C. 
§2307.01 defines 'action' as: an 
ordinary proceeding in a court of justice, 
involving process, pleadings, and ending in a 
judgment or decree by which a party prosecutes 
another for the redress of a legal wrong 
" Emphasis added, Ohio v. Smith, supra 
Finally, there is no legal authority to support the 
proposition that a proceeding for determination of wrongful 
incarceration be assigned to the original criminal trial docket ~ 
"Civil Procedure Local Rule 15 sets forth the procedure for case 
assignments and for the transfer of cases. There was no reason for 
this civil case to be transferred inasmuch as the subject matter of 
this case is distinct from the prior criminal prosecution and the 
rules of discovery and burden of proof are different. " Milton 
Cotton v. State of Ohio, Eighth Appellate District, Case No. 67403, 
April 6, 1995. 
2 
Ohio authority is abundantly clear that a proceeding for 
wrongful incarceration is a civil action subject to the Ohio Civil 
Rules. For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion of the State 
of Ohio for judgment on the pleadings should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, Prosecuting 
Attorney of Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
MARILYN B KLEY CASSIDY (,OO 4647) 
AssistaNJt Prosecuting Att{olt'ney 
Courts Tower - Eighth Floo"r 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Reply has been served by regular 
U.S. mail, - \ postage prepaid t o Terry H. Gilbert, Attorney for 
Petitioner, Special Administrator of the Estate of Samuel H. 
Sheppard at 1700 Standard Building, 1370 Ontario Street, Cleveland, 
'1~f11 Ohio 44113 this G 1 l day of July, 1996. 
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l()Tfl CASE of l.cvel 1 primed in FULL format. 
STATE oJ OHIO. Appcilcc v. NEIL S. IACKSON, Appellant 
I 
i C.A. No. 93CA~72$ 
I 
COURf OF APPEALS IF OHIO. NINTH APPEU.ATB DISTRICT, LORAIN COUNTY 
1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1737 
I April 20, 1994, Decided 
I 
I 
NOTICE: [*l) THE LEXIS PAGINAII10N OF THIS 
DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING 
R.ELEASB OF THB FINAL PtmlJSllBD VERSION. 
I 
PRIOR IIlSTORY: APPBAL FROM nIDGMENT 
ENTERED IN nm COMMON ~s COURT. 
COUNTY OF LORAIN, omq. CASE NO. 
91CR040727 I 
I 
DISPOSmON: The trial coun'a ~is affimled. 
COUNSEL: GREGORY A. WlilTB, ~ 
Attorney, 226 Middle A.Ye., Elyria, Of 44033. 
NEIL JACKSON, #242-441, 207~ JS. Avon-Belden 
Road, Grafton, OH 44044. 
I 
JUDGES: REECE, COOK. DICKINSON 
I 
OPINlONBY: FOR nm COURT; JOI W. REECE 
OPINION: ~ECISION AND 10URNr BNTKY 
Dared: April 20, 1994 
This C8WlC was .beard upon the rccorq in the trial coun. 
Each error uaigned has bcco reviewed~ the following 
disposition is made: / 
REECE, P.J. Plaintiff-appellant, Neil Jackson appeals 
the trial coun's denial of his motion /for a detemlina-
rion that he WU wrongfully impriaoni:Q pursuant to R.C. 
2743.48. We affirm. i 
Jackson was indicted on Aueust 20, 1991, on ouc 
cowa of~. R.C. 2921.34(A), which catried a spec- · 
ific.ation for a. prior violent offense. <J>n December 11, 
1991, Jackion was convicted of escapci with the specifi-
cation and &CDtcnccd to a tw0-dve year jail term. J aclaon 
appealed hit conviction to this coun and rcvcrscd it for 
insufficient evidenc=. Stale v. Jackso111(0ct. 21, 1992). 
[Wl] Lorain App. No. 92CA00~283 J unrcponed. On 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
August 30, 1993, Jacbon moved for dctcmiinadcn that 
he WU WI'OD&fully impriaoocd. 1'be motion WU filed in 
the criminal cue which included bis original indic""cm 
The trial coun denied thia motion. 1acbon appcaJa. m. 
ine u hia sole aasipmcat of error the trial comt' 1 denial 
of this motion. 
Initially, we DOtc tbatllD acaiollioc.--falimpriami.. 
mcatwt..• ... ,.,~·---••Mirmi... . 
nuion of w10119W.illpc• •in Cbeaimbiia.a.• 
wbicla die con~ OC01111tc9 An action brought pur-
suam to R.C. 2743.48 and R.C. 230~.02 for wroqfu1 
imprisomnc:nt.ia-a..cbdla::diou"lVUdln ~ Stam (1989), 
47 Ohio St.3d 47, SJ, S47 N.E.1.d 962. Civ.R. 3(A) 
reqakll dlaa.~if.tCll•C H~ ...... fDlrll(:;· 
of I rmrpl1 *'1.<bt'1W>JredrodM'-of lizpltJW'(J9'JJ; 
87 Ollio~Si-6l,..cW.N.B.2d.Mt:.httlda.cue, ~·~ 
Jackson attempted to obtain a detcrmhwion of wron&fiU 
l.ropriaomncm by filing ems motion in hia crimim.1 C&K. 
This is an iuapproprialz: avenue to seek the remedy he 
rcquesu. 
Even if Jac.klon bad ptoperiy commenced this ilction, 
[*3] be has not mec his burden of provUig lhat he wu 
wroDifully imprisoned. In a Procecdins \mdor ,R.C. 
2303.02,. a claimant Dllllt prove bis itmt>CCDQC by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. lVUden supra, puasrapb 
three of the syllabua. A claimant may no& merely rely on 
the judiJDcnt of acquiual in his criminal cue to prove 
the civil wrongful imprilooment c.laim. Id. al 51-52. 
A judgment of acquittal la not necea11rily a fiDdina mat 
an accused is innocent; rather it is a fmdiDg that the 
sratc did not prove its case beyond a reuonable doubt. 
Id. In reYersing Jacbcm's conviction. wo were holdiq 
tha& tbc st.au; had not proved bey~ • rrMJDlble doubt 
that I a.caon bad ~. It doe8 DOt ncccsarily fol-
low from that judgment tbat Jacbon was inoocem. Nor 
docs it prove dlaL he was WIODgfully impriloaed undcT 
R. C. 2743.48. Thus, Jackson wu required to produce 
more evidc:m:e of his imlocm::e than the revcnal of his 
conviction. Thi• !lie failed to do. 
• 
J 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1737, •3 
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I 
It also appears that J8':klon WU ~ for scp-
mte offemca while he was im~ OD rhc C8CaPC 
charge. In ruling on a motion to expunge tbia [•4) con-
viction from Ja.ckaon's record on Feijnwy 22, 1993. 
the . aial coun fov.Dd that J acbon wal incarccr.ared on 
charges of aggr:avar.cd trafftcting and pqssession of crim-
inal tool.a. If a defeDdmt is scnrrind (or ocher offcmes 
oot related to tile conviction of which he ii acquitted, it 
is qucsdonable wbetber he may be toOnd to be wrong-
fully impriaoiled puquant to R.C. 2l43.48(A)(l)-(5). 
Jae.Don's assijnmeut of error is ov~ 
I 
The trial ccun'sj•ldiJDcm is affinncid. 
I 
Tho Court fiDda tbat dlcre were l'Cl80Dlblc ground! 
for thia appeal. ! 
~order that a~ mandate issue out of dna court, 
dirccdna the Coamy of LoDin Common Plea Court to 
carry this judjllleDt iD1o eucwion. A cctti&:d copy of 
this jouma1 entl')' shall comQbltl: the mandate, puxlUIDl 
to App.R. 27. 
ImmediucJy upon the filing hereof, thia dnannent 
shall constitute the joumal emry of judp>c:nt, and it 
shall be tile sta.mp;d by• Cleric of the Coun of Appeals 
at which time the period for review shall bqin to NI1. 
App.R. 22(B). 
Costs rued ro Appellant. 
Exceptiooa. 
10HN w. RBBCB, FOR THE coma 
• 
i 
23RD CASE 1f Level 2 printed in FULL format. 
STATE OF OHIO, ~laintiff-Appellant v. LARRY T. SMITI1, 
I Defendant-Appellee 
C.A. No. 13801; ~HE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCTIMENT IS 
SUBJECT TO CHANGi PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED 
VERSION. 
I 
Court of Appeal& of Ohio, Nir.th Appellate District, Summit 
J County 
1 1 89 Ohio App. LEXIS 2019 
June 7, :989, Decided 
~IOR HISTORY: 
'l] 
PAGE 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENT~ IN THE C8MMON PLEA.9 COURT, COUNTY OF SUMMIT, 
[IO, CA$}j; NO. CR 76 3 383. I 
:sPOSITION: Appellant's ass~gnment of e=::-or is well taken. Judgment of the 
~ial court is reversed and Uhis case is ~emanded for proceedings consistent 
.th this opinion. I 
>UNSEL1 PHIL!? D, BOGDANOFF, A.il&t. Prosecutor, Akron, Ohio, :or Plaintiff, 
DONALD s. VARIAN, JR., At~orney at Law, Akron, Ohio, for Defendant. 
SIMON B. KAR.AS, Asst. Attdrney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Amicus Curiae. 
I 
JDGES: WILLIAM R. BAIRD, FO~ THE COURT , CACIOPPO, P. J., REECE, J,, CONCUR. 
'INIONBY: BAIRD I 
I 
'INION: DECISION AND JOY~~·~~ ENTRY 
BAIRD, J, 
34 
Thia cause was heard upon the =record in the trial court. Each error asaigned 
ts been reviewed and the fo lowing disposition is made: 
This cause came before thJ court upon the appeal of the State of Ohio from 
i e trial court's order finding that the appellee, Larry T. Smith was a 
~ongfully imprisoned individual pursuant to R.C. 2305.02 and R.C. 2743.48. We 
~verse. · · · I · · · . -··· 
In 1976, Smith waa charged with one count of aggravated murder and one count 
: aggravated robbery. He waived·:. a jury t rial and the case . was subsequently 
~ied in front of a three-julge panel. Tha panel found Smith guilty on both 
)Unta and sentenced [*2] him to f i ve to twenty-five years on the 
;gravated robbery charge an life i mprisonment on the aggravated murder charge. 
ie sentences were to be served concurrencly. On January 12, 1979, Smith moved 
:iunta. In December of· 1986 Smith brought an action for wrongful 
r a new trial which was gr1nted by the crial . court. The case was again tried 
: this time before a jury. The jury recurned a verdict of not guilty on both 
I 
I 
I 
I.I • •n 11 v t , 1l;. , .,._ . , .., , , ,.... _ 
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.prisonment in the court of conunon pleas. The court conducted hearinga in 
.nuary and February. Becaus of pending legislation which could affect Smith's 
aim, the trial court ataye the case until the new legislation became 
'fective. / 
On August 16, 1988, a vis~ting judge was appointed to decide Smith's case . 
. thout conducting a hearing /and without notifying the State, the judge ruled 
Lat Smith was a wrongfully ~mprieoned individual as defined in R.C . .2305.02 and 
c. 2743.48. The State appeals. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 
'he trial court committed e,ror in finding that the defendant was a wrongfully 
1prisoned individual withou conductir.g a de novo hearing and giving the State 
i opportunity to be heard. 11 
The State claims that the!common pleas court [*3] should have conducted a 
! novo hearing before rulin on whether Smith was a wrongfully imprisoned 
tdividual. A two-tiered sch me existe in Ohio whereby one can seek reparation 
·cm the State for an errone us imprisonment. The.-fillng· of an:; ~~a tba. .. 
>urt ·of . oc:mimcm pleaa initia~e• the pro~eeding. The governing statute ·, · as it 
:ad at the time of Smith's Jction, provided that: 
~ court of common plaas ha& exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear and 
itermine an action or proce ding that: i.s commenced by an individual who 
isfies divisions (A) (1) t (3) of section 2743.48 of the Revised Code and 
.t seeks a determination b the court that the of fen&e of which he was found 
•ilty, including all le••er included offenses, either was not committed by him 
~ was not committed by any erson. If the court enters the requested 
:termination, i t shall comp y with division (B) of that section. 11 
c. 2305.0::l 
ien the court of common ple s "determines" that the plaintiff i• a wrongfully 
'!prisoned individual, it mudt inform him of his right to commence a civil 
!tion against the state in lhe court of claims. R. C. 2743.48(B) (l). _ 
The complainant conclusivily eatabliahea he is a wrongfully [*4] · 
'!prisoned person by submitt'ng to the court of claims a certified copy of the 
~ial court's judgment entry of his conviction and sentencing and a certified 
ipy of the common pleas cou t's determination that he was wrongfully . 
1prisoned. The statute read 
11 * ·* . * 
:El (l) . In . a civil action as described in division (D) of this section, the 
)mplainant may establish th the is a wrongfully .imprisoned individual by 
ibmitting to the court of c~aimsa certified copy of the judgment .entry. of the 
)Urt of common pleas asaoci~ted with his conviction and sentencing, and a 
irtified copy of the entry qf the determination of a court of common pleas that 
! is a wrongfully imprisone~ individual because the offense of which he wa• 
~und guilty, in~luding all l esser-included offenses, either was not committed 
him or. was not committed by any person. No other evidenca shall be required 
the complainant to e11tabli&h that he i s a wrongfully imprisoned_. individual, 
id he shall :.be . irrebuttably jpresumed to be a wrongfully imprisoned . 
r"'. ~ ft "" i , / \ ._ l , \ol' V¥ i• l i 1 
1989 Ohio App. :£XIS 2019 1 *4 
ldividual. n j 
"* * * II jl 
c. 2743.4S(El (1). The cour of claims would then be rl!quired to 
)mplainant a sum of money consisting of certain coats, expenses 
)St wages enumerated in the istatute, plus$ 25,000 for each year 
1prisonment. See R.C. 2743.48(E) (2) (a)-(c). 
I 
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award the 
['*5] and 
of 
Smith argues that the co~on pleas court complied with the statutory scheme 
ien it 11 determined 11 that he jwas wrongfully imprisoned. The State argues that 
C. 2305.02 and R.C. 2743.4~ require the court to conduct a trial · de novo. The 
:ate claims that in the ins~ant case, the common pleas court accepted the 
1ry's verdict of not guiltyj a• conclusive evidence that Smith was wrongfully 
iprisoned. 
In its decision, the tria court did no~ indicate its reasoning or what 
ridance it relied on in reaahing its decision. What is clear, however, is that 
ie trial court made its rul ~ng without th& partie& appearing before it. Based 
)On the language employed irl the statuce, and the current case l~w, such a 
iling by the court was erro~ . 
R.C. 2305.0• and R.C. 274~.48, muat be read in p~i materia..becauae they 
~eHftn"!r"itatu!Ory-' proces through· which an individual mu•t p:cg're•• ... .befcre 
! can recover mone~arily. I order to ascertain the meaning of the two statutes 
execute them in accordanqe with that meaning, we must look to the language 
Jd by the legislacure. Henk (*6] v. Trustee (1891), 48 Ohio St. 671. 
~evident Bank v. Wood (1973), 36 Ohio St. 2d 101, 105. R.C. 2305.0~ invests the 
mrt of common pleas with j risdiction 11 to hear and determine an action or 
~oceeding 11 that is brought y an individual who was indicted for an aggravated 
1lony or fe~ony, was found guilty and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 
C. 2743.4B(A) (1) (3). The ~tatute in conjunction with R.C. 2743.48 does more 
ian imbue the court with ju~isdiction as Smith argue&, but alao describes the 
rpe of proceeding• which muat occur at the common pleas level. The court has 
~iginal jurisdiction 11 to hear and determine an action or proceeding."· The. 
irase "hear and determine 11 ~elates to the function of the court to try and to 
!cide all questions involved in a controversy presented to the court. See Quarl 
Abbot (1885), 102 Ind. 233, 1 NE 476 . The term implies that the parties are 
~fore the court. 15 Americal' and English Encyclopedia of· Law (2 Ed 1900) 307. 
ie word 11 action 11 as used in the statute has a specific statutory definition . 
. c. 2307-. 01 defines "act·ion a11~ 
r * * an· ordinary proceedin in a court of ju•tice, involving.: proc-., ~ 
.eadings, [*7] and endi~g in a judgment or decree, by which a party 
:osecutes another for the r dreaa of a legal wrong, enforcement of a legal 
.ght, or the punishment of public offense. 11 - .. - : 
I - . 
lus, the wording of R.C. 2305.02 suggests that the legislature intended the 
,mmon pleas court . to adjudiqate the issue of whether. an individual is 
~ongfully imprisoned after . ~ he parties have presented their positions in-an 
iversa.ry aetting. I 
I Our int•~ratation ia also supported by the language utilized · in 2743;48. 
der this . section an indivi~ual who brings an . action. in the .court of cqmmon 
.eaa :ll8ed.not wait until hi oonviction WA• rever••d but may bring the' action 
r .... n v l \ / \ o.. ' ' ""' ..,.., •• ,1 , 1 '- I .., .... ..., I ..,.., 1io I tT 
I 
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' ter his sentencing, during Jhis imprisonment or after he ·served his sentence. 
c. 2743.48(A) (4). nl Because the plaintiff need not aubmit to the court any 
ridance of a reversal. of hi~ conviction, he must present some quantity of proof 
iowing he did not commit th~ crime or that no one conunitted it. The traditional 
!aeure of persuasion in a civil case is by a preponderance of the evidence. As 
:ated by the Supreme court: 
~here is no doctrine of the law settled more firmly than the rule which 
lthorizes issues of fact in civil cases to [*Bl be determined in accordance 
.th the preponderance or weight of the evidence. The reaaon of the rule no 
)ubt is, that as between man and man, where a lose must fall upon one or the 
:her, it is right that the ~aw should cast it upon him who is shown to have 
~en the cause of tha loaa, ~y proof e&cablishing the reaaonable probability of 
ie fact." I 
I 
I 
II* * *,II f 
I 
'nee, Str&nathan & Co. v. Greaves (1874), 26 Ohio St. 2, 4. The nature of 
.1ith' s action in the common jpleas court is civil for he is seeking redress of a 
.vil wrong. Thus, he must ptove he was wrongfully imprisoned by a preponderance 
: tha evidence. I 
! 
nl The statutory references in the ~ex~ are to R.C. 2743.48 as it existed 
~ior to March 17, :989, whi~h is the effective date of an amendment which added 
prerequisite that the inditidual's conviction was vacated, dismissed or 
rersed on appeal . I 
Other juriadictions have ~onatrued R.C. 2305.02 and R.C. 2743.48 to require 
lat the party bringing the action in the court of common pleas prove that he 
~d not commit the offense for which he was convicted. See Mueller v. State 
)ecember 12, 1988), Warren ~P· 88-05-037, unreported; Walden v. State [*9] 
Tune 16, 1988), Franklin Apj. No. 87 AP-1026, unreported; Ellis v. State (June 
;, 1988), Franklin App. NO. 87 AP-1099. In these caeee, the courts held that no 
,11ateral estoppel effect would be given to the reversal of the . complain~t's 
mviction; Id. We find that lthese decisions a.re consistent with our .review of · 
ie statutor scheme contained in R.C. 2305.02 and R.C. 2743.48. 
i 
The Court: finds that · theri were reasonable grounds· for this appeal. 
we order that a special mandate issue out of this court, · directing the County 
. Summit Common Pleas .court Ito carry this judgment into execution. A certified 
)PY of this journal entry slla11 ·constitute the ·mandate, . pursuant to -App. R,. 27. 
Immediately upon the fili~g hereof , t his document shall cons~itute the · 
)urnal entry of judgmen~, and it shall be file . stamped by the Clerk of the 
)Urt· of Appeal& at which ti1e the period £or review shall begin to run. App. R. 
? (E) • 
Costs taxed to appellee. 
Exceptions. I 
I 
I 
WILLIAM R. BAIRD, FOR THE COURT, CACIOPPO, P. J. , . REECE, J .• , CONCUR.. - . .. 
. 
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22ND CASE jf Level 2 printed in FULL format. 
STATE OF OHIO, /Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J&RRY NEELEY, 
J Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. CA89-02-005; THE LEXIS PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT 
IS SUBJECT '!'O CHANCfE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED 
I VERSION. 
I 
Cour1; of Appea]s of Ohio, Twelfth Appellate District, 
J
' Preble county 
l 89 Ohio App. LEXIS 2960 
July 31, l989, Decided 
:SPOSITION: (*l) 
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Judgment reversed and remanded. 
>UNSEL: Wilfrid Q. Dues, Pr]/ble County Prosecuting Attorney, Eaton, Ohio, for 
.ain~iff-Appellee. 
Kuczak & Stukay, Konrad K czak, Dayton, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellant. 
i Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr ~ , Ohio Attorney General, Simon B. Karas, Columbus, 
iio, Amicus Curiae for the l hio Attorney General . 
.iGES: KOEHLER, J., YOUNG, J., concurs separately. JONES, P.J., dissents. 
>INIONBY 1 KOEHLER 
irNION: OPINION 
KO~, J. Defeno.nt-app~llant, Jerry Neeley, wae convicted by a jury of 
>rcible rape in the Preble , aunty Court of Common Pleas on October 14, 1983. He 
ta subsequently sentenced t serve five to twenty-five years in the Ohio State 
mitentiary. 
Immediately after his coni iction, appellant's bond was revoked. Therefore, 
>r approximately one year d ring the pendency of hie appeal,. appellant remained 
icarcerated by the state of Ohio. 
Appellant obtained a reve~aal of his conviction in this court by a memorandum 
iciaion and judgment entry dated October 9, 1984 in Preble CA83-10-029. We 
>und appellant ·wa& entitledj to a new trial based on evidentiary errors 
>mmitted -by the - lower court Specifically, the trial court improperly permitted 
~ior bad act testimony to b received and refused [*2] to allow appellant to 
iswer an ultimate question of fact on direct examination. Subsequently, the 
:ate did not seek ta retry , ppellant , and thereupon, dismissed the indictment 
l ·June 9, 1985. . . · . 
on February 11, 1988, app~llant applied to the Preble county court of common 
.eas for a declaration that jhe was a "wrongfully imprisoned individual pursuant 
Revised Code section 2743 48~ Sections (A) (l). through (A) (4) . "The state 
.led to respond to appellant's application. 
- I 
I 
I 
I 
' ~:Nl ~r;AI IU"N: T UeNe~~~ 
1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2960, *2 
I 
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The lower court summarily joverruled said application, finding that "(t]he 
finition of improperly imp~isoned individual• doe• not, nor .does the court 
.lieve it w&s intended to, i nclude those persons whose convictions were 
versed due to an error at ttrial." 
Appallan~ timely filed th~ s instant appeal setting forth the following 
isignment of error: : 
i 
"The trial court committed prejudicial error in overruling 
! fendant-appellan~'s application to be found a wrongfully imprisoned 
idi vi dual . " I 
Appellant contend• that he was a wrongfully imprisoned individual and 
lerefore entitled to damages against the state. The argument advanced by 
lpellant reasons that a reversal and dismissal of his prior conviction 
'nclusively establishes [*3] his innocence, for purposes of a wrongful 
iprisonment action. We disagree. 
Ohio has adopted a two-st Jp procedure for compensating those individuals 
~ongfully imprisoned. nl The first step requires a cou~ of common pleas to 
~termine whether one wa• a 'I wrongfully imprisoned individual" as set forth in 
C. 2305.02 as follows: 
I 
~court of common pleas ha• iexclusive, original j urisdiction to hear and 
~termine an action or proceeding that is commenced by an individual who 
isfies divisions (A) (l) to (3) of section 2743.48 of the Revised Coda and 
.At seeks a determination by the court that the off snse of which he was found 
lilty, including all lesser1included offenses, either was not committed by him 
~ was not committed by any ~erson. * * * . 11 
I 
nl The wrongful imprisonmdnt statutes which apply in this case are R.C. 
143.48 and R.C. 2305.02 , effective September 24, 1986. An amended legislative 
~raion has recently been enacted by t he General Assembly in its 1988 session, 
~ing . effective March 17, 1989. For all purpoaea, the former provisions apply 
.nee appellant's determination by the court of common pleas on January 23, 
189, is well before the effective date of this new legislation. [*4] 
I 
The second step then provides for a civil action to be brought in the - court 
claims pursuant to R.C. 2143.48 whereby the determination made by the court 
r common pleas is an irrebul table presumption. 
In ·the case ~ub j udice, · t e fir~t step of this analysis is in issue. R. C. 
143.48(A) lists the four requirements necessary to prove wrongful - imprisonment 
i a proceeding before a cou~t of common pleas under R.C. 2305.02. The 
ld1v1dual must prove the fol lowing : 
(1) He -was :charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code by an 
idictment or information prior to, or on or after, the affective date of thia 
~ction, and the violation c1arged was an aggravated felony or felony. 
(2) He was found guilty of tthe particular charge or a lesser-included offense 
r the court or jury involved, and the offense of which he waa found guilty was 
aggravated .felony or felony . 
- I I 
(3) He .was .sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of imprisonment in a 
I 
I 
' 
I 
i 
• I 
\ 
.., ,:;.n I lo.I I •,.... I I ~ f,I\ ~ 1 .,._ 1\ - · •r"'I - V .. ... ¥.., I - W.., I •1 1 
"" ' '""' ' ' · - · · - ""¥1' 11 I 
I 
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ilty. 
· ~ e pena or re ormacory 11st1tut1on or t e offense of which he was found 
4) Subsequent to his sentencing and during or subsequent to his imprisonment, 
. was determined by a court lot common ple~s that the offense o! [*5] which 
: wa• found guilty, includi~g all lesser-included offenses, either waa not 
>mmitted by him or was not qommitted by any person. n 
Appellant clearly satisfids the first three requirements of R.C. 2743.48(A) 
.nee he was charged and con~icted of forcible rape and sentenced to a term of 
~risonment in a penal inst~tution for the offense for which he was found 
Lilty. The dispute in this lnstance centers on the manner the court of common 
.eas determined appellant was not a "wrongfully imprisoned individual." 
In Mueller v. State (Dec. /12, 1988), warren App. No. CA88-0S-037, unrl!lport:.ed, 
liS court held that t~e cou~t below erred in finding that a prior 
!termination of not guilty ~n a criminal prosecution was binding in a civil 
·oceeding to recover damages against the atace. Rather, we established that 
c. 2743.48 and 2305.02 re~ire& a de novo determination of whether the 
.aimant did not commit the qffense or the offense was not committed by anyone. 
!e State v. Smith (June 7, ~989), Summit App. No. CAl380l, unreported. 
I 
In the instant case, the ~rial court did not indicate its rea&oning except to 
.y that an improperly imprisoned individual does not include (*6] those 
!rsons whose convictions ar~ reversed due to an error at trial. Therefore, it 
clear that the lower cou~ made its ruling without the benefit of thl!I partiee 
earing before it. Hence, ~aaed on the language in R.C. 2305.02 and our case 
.w, such a ruling by the cott was error. · 
Further, since a criminal !defendant is not required to submit ·evidence for a 
iversal·cf his conviction, ~e must in a civil proceeding for damages present 
•me degree of proof showin~that he did not commit the crime or that no one 
•mmitted it. Thua, aince t -burden of proof and· evidentiary·requi&•• nta- in a 
.vil matter a.re not eauival t to a criminal trial, the tria:L c~1Sle 11~ 
1nduot ~ ·d1t vDQ.VC , hearing pr Or to- determining ··whether an· indi Vidual:;. ---rbeen•' 
rrcmgfully impr!aoned; 11 J 
The Franklin County Court of Appeals has previously addreaaed the effect of 
1 acquittal on a determinat on of wrongful imprisonment pursuant to R.C. 
'43.48 and 2305.02. In Elli v. State (June 16, 1988), Franklin App. No. 
·-AP-1099, unreported, and Walden v. State (June ·16, -1988), Franklin App .. No. 
'-AP-1026, unreported, n2 ttte plaintiff's convictions were reversed on appeal . . 
•on retrial, both [*7] E~lis and Walden were acquitted. They subsequently 
·ought actions for wrongful !imprisonment which we.re well-taken by th& --court of 
1mmon plea& due to the acqu~ttals. ·. -
n.2 These ca.see were accepJ ed for review by the .Ohia ·supreme ~~urt on -
:ptember 28, 1908, and are currently pending before the court as appeals and 
·oss-appeals in case• numbe, ed 88-1434, 88-1435, 88-14.39, and 88...,1440. 
The Franklin county Court ,of Appeals differed, -holding that an acquittal doee 
•t establish that an individual has been wrongfully imprisoned within. the 
:aning of th~ statute. The ~ourt reasoned: 
I 
ne key issue here is wheth~r the General Assembly intended that . thare_be _ a ~ 
\ 
_,_ ,, , W I •n1 . ... t \I '- · --··-··r·- ~ W .;J 1J I w ' '11 .., , ' I ' 
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,~lateral eatoppel effa~t iJ the civil action of a factual determination made 
1 th~ criminal proceeding in which the claimant was ultimately found not 
dlty. ~8UCA.d.ntent, .·U - • ted-.11paaifically·in ther~•t:atmt.eaif~.· ') 
>ll&ter&l. .... •aeoppel . effect b given to facl:u&l -detarmin&tioa~in.;:{i · 
~-a..-... · - · ;~if i~,?erf~ Ol.J>i"ao~~~=.u~~r.t:,,..Jtate to 
. _ _ .. a . '·· , - - CluC!ed -~!'befOld<•n•.,,,•ble 
lubt. Mo.reoveE, self-incri~tion, privilege, and dieeo.we~'"""· · t -*·&J.. L. ... rm:.. ·are'· 
.fferent• ·IDd:~criuain•l .. ~~c•ec;iing, the ~tate may not depo•e-· the-def"endant .... 
>r · raqat-ire-,;-~end•nt to tee~ify involuntar1ly. 11 .....,, 
We adhere to and adopt th~ s analysis ae set forth in Mueller, supra. 
1ere£ore, appellant's aaaig~ment of error i8 well-taken requiring the court 
!low to conduct a full de novo hearing in order to datermine whether appellant 
LB "wrongfully imprisoned. 11 
>NCURBY: YOUNG 
lNCUR: YOUNG, J., concurring separately. I write separately only to stress 
1at, while the bsttar pract.ilce would be to file a separate action to determine 
claim of wrongful imprisonment, there is nothing in either R.C. 2305.02 or 
C. 2743.48 to preclude sucM determination in the original criminal action. 
c. 2305.02 refers to na.n aqtion or proceeding. 11 Since this does not 
1ecifically mandate a filing other than in the original criminal case, I agree 
Lat the ~ourt ot common pleas had authority to proceed in that caae. 
I 
I agr•• t~t the cited st~tutes l"equire a hearing to determine the issue of 
ngful imprisonment and, ttterefore, agree th&t the matter must be reveraed and 
:1nanded for further proceed, ngs. 
:SSENTBY: JONES 
I 
:SSENT 1 JONES, P. J., dis sending. While I concur generally with the holding of 
ie majority [*9] - thac th~s case must be remanded to the trial court, I would 
!mand for a different reason. Quite simply, there is no final appealable order, 
.d the matter is not proper.ljy before this court. This matter came to the 
.tention of the trial court lwhen appellant filed, on February 11, 1988, an 
.strument entitled 11 Applica ion For Determinatinn.,•'l'ha.t::: Defendant;. .._.~nlly 
1p~isoned I~_yj.~_11~~~ H ~~;.ga~.io~~ _was- filedr:i~~.OZ.iginal:-~ ···- ·· l 
:ticm;,.:. ,. undez:. ·, caae;W~ . -· 9"2:~feupon· , tha ·;.t-ri&L..,c:~•w•~~, 
.at such "application' be d nied. Proceduralily;::·-appa&±lfflit. ZinikJ 11 saec];.: 
oivi'i:~zon;;. ,purauant --to - ~. c .-. ~ .2305 • .o~, saeking~. a..-. .Gle9c•kntiiiclD oa..-~:,•; ... ..  .,.. 
fense for which he was found gui lty wa~ either not committed by him or not 
•mmitted by any person. App~llant would have had .the burden of proof in- such 
vil action, but would at l~ast have been entitled to a hearing. If appellant 
.iled to prove anything mor than the mere fact that his conviction -was ~ · 
versed, it would have been entirely proper for the trial judge to. deny relief , 
wali done · in this case. Th . appeals in Walden, supra, :and Mueller, supra, were 
·om separate civil actiona fliled by Waldan [*10] and Mueller, claiming. that 
.ey had been wrongfully imp~' soned, and were entitled to seek damages in the 
.urt of Claims. There ha• b n no ••parace civi_l ~c_t, iQn . _ ;i.Jl-~- ta....caaa,,ba£ora ua.. 
d I would "'therefore : dismis the appeal because there ·hn -·been- na··~i"ml"l .... 
·pe.abl:e order. · ~· - - ·. ·· - ·· 
I 
I 
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JAMES M. PORTER, Jl. , 
Plaintiff-app~llant Milton Cotton appeals from the judgment 
i 
of the Coznmon_ Pleaf Court that he was not a wrongfully imprisoned 
person en1:itled to ~ompensation f.rom the State, defendant-appellee, 
' . 
pursuant to R.C. 27\.t3.48. Plaintiff claims t~e court's rulinq was 
cont.rary to the law and the evidence, that he was entitled. to 
swranarY j~;ment and proper answers to his request for admissions, 
I 
I 
and that ·'he case ~hould have been transferred. to the judqe who 
I 
conduc~edli1 criminal trial. We find no merit to the appeal and 
affirm tl result ~low. 
I 
CotJl i.tAs indicted on four counts for receiving stolen 
propert~.C. 29l3 l51) and related crimes arising out of events 
, I 
that ocfed on Se~tember 10, 1987. - 1; . 
onat date, \Cleveland Police Detectives investigated . a 
< t · 
complai'f criminal activity occurring at 98.28 Elwell Avenue; · 
clevel Ohio. THe detectives went ~o that address and found 
i 
thJ:'ee and a pick-up truck in the driveway. A blue pick-up 
I 
truck I a blue C~dillac were parked in the backyard of the 
I 
iocat the spot where the o~iginal two car gArage once stood. 
! 
I 
A g:ca llac was pi rked in tha driveway behind th• blue Cadillac 
and a vehkle '\lf'ae parked behind the gray Cadillac. The blue 
i 
And th~ bluca CAdillac w4ilre not .. viaib.le ···from · the..-~ 
stre \ 
I 
. fh• detactiyes arrived, they found Atlas Phillips, ~ who"-=-
liv~e address, 1:&tand.inq next to the ciriver •a door of . a -gray 
' ;;i c:. 1~ I 0 j • f"l I I "l'\11 C:. 1 IJC:.11C:.l'\f"ll .. ;;; '11 I "" ' "" , r ~ 1 
t - , """"'""'"' f ""'V - I..,. I -.. 
- 3 -
19 7 8 Cadillac, the second car from the street. Cott.on• a car -was 
I 
parked closest to the street and had been backed into the driveway. 
I 
Inside the qray Cadillac the datecti ves found Cotton workinq 
bensath the neerin~ column with some tool•. The &tearing column 
had been peeled to a~low a person to bypass the ignition lock and 
I . 
start the car without an iqnition key. The paint identification 
plate waa missinq from the car's fi.rewall under the hood. Th• 
v•nicle identificatibn number (VIN) on the dashboard indicated 4 
I 
1977 Cadillac. Wit~ the permission of Phillips and Cotton, the 
I 
police looked at the 1other vehicles in the driveway. 
' 
The third Cai' fzom the street, a blue 1978 Cadillac, also had 
I 
its steerinq column pjeled. Its da1hboard had been damaged and its 
radio removed. Th•· tIN, normally found on the dashboard near the 
I 
windshi6J'ld on the driver's side, was missinq. 
I 
Next to the pick-up t:ruck on the ground were found varioue 
: I 
mechanic's tools and \a steer~nq column which had been pAintad to 
i 
match the damaqed steering column of the gray Cadillac. None of 
the three vehicles hJd license plAtes, although the gray Cadillac 
I 
hAd a temporary taq ~n the back bumper. 
i 
Cotton and Phillips were arrested and the cara and pick-up 
, I 
truck were towed to a ~olice impound lot for · further· investigation· .... 
I 
I 
It ·· was determined thllti · (l) the · VIN number · found on" the gray 
I 
Cadillac did not match · the· actual model · year of the car;.. ( 2) th•= 
I 
gro.y Cadillac had tieen · reported stolen· · in Alabama· from it& 
I 
reqistered ownar: and (3) the ·pick-up truck waa raqi&tered to a · 
t . 
..;:.111 '-" , •"" 1 1 """ "u - , --" - ·'r· -
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Townville, Pennsylvania. owner, but had b .. n reported stolen in 
Cleveland on May 241 11987. 
Prior to. th• aUEt cf trial, the court denied Cotton• e renewed 
motion to suppress the evidence found at th• erime scene. At th• 
close of the State•s1 case, the court granted Cotton's motion for 
acquittal pursuant tc Crim. R. 29, on: Count Ona, Receiving Stolen 
Property (the qray 1 Cadillac) ; Count 'l'hree, Receiving Stolen 
Property (the blue 1 Cadillac) ; and Count Four, Possession of 
Criminal Tools (the mechanic's tools). The trial court granted 
Cotton's motion due to the State's failure to present any evidance 
that the Cadillacs were actually stolen. Cotton presented no 
witnesses. The jury convicted Cotton on the sole remaininq charge 
ot receivinq stolen property, the 1978 Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
His post-conviction motions were den.i.ed. On November 3, ·1988, 
Cotton was eentanced Ito a term of two to t•n years. 
on appeal to thils Court, hia conviction on the pick-up truck 
was rever•ed and he was discharged. state v. Cotton (April ·12, 
1990), Cuyahoqa App. No. 56775, unreported. This Court held that 
Cotton waa illlproperl~ indicted and th• evidence adduced at trial 
did not demonstrate tha~ app~llant had posaeaaion of th• pick-up 
truck ·for · the purpose of disposing of it or to w-ithhold·· it -
I 
peEnanently from the ewnar, nor w.aa there evidence to show he knew 
it was ·· l!ltolan. Id. 1 at ll. The Court stated• "At beat,·· the. 
avidence infers that appellant was guilty of unauthorized uae of' 
a vehicle" with which l he was not charged·. The jury• s verdict wae· 
• 
·~:1' I 0 ) • f". I I Vl'\ll~ i _.~l\~;>f'\-
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not raveraad due to a lack of evidence of criminal activity, but 
more from the trial court's improper in11tructiona to tha jUJ:Y and 
tha Stat•'• failure to prove its ca•• beyond a rea•ona.ble cioU}:)t. I . 
I 
Plaintiff brow;pt a civil actionr.r under R.C. 2305.02 and 
' 
2743.48 to recover campensation from the State for beinq a per&on 
wronqfully imprisoned until he waB discharq•d by the Court of 
Appeal• order. The case was submitted by agreement on tha briefs, 
! 
tranacript of the cr.ilninal trial and Cotton's deposition. 
At his depoeitibn, Cotton denied any knowledge of stolen 
vehicles or the existence of. any criminal activity. 
! 
Cotton 
testified he did not lfind it odd to observe aaveral vehicles in 
Phillip5 1 s driveway without license plates and intact steering 
i 
columns. On the day cf the arrest, Cotton went over to Phillipa's 
house to work on his 1·own vehicl&. He saw Phillipa workinq on a 
broken eteerinq column and, due to his prior knowledqe of stearinq 
columns, . ha decided to lend a hand. Cotton, who is a certified 
mechanic with certif.Jlcates from both Mansfield Reformatory and 
I 
i 
Marion Correctional Ilnstituta, testified that h• haa worked on 
"quite a few columns in [his] time." 
The trial court. :fourid that "There is no evidence before this 
I 
Court -that prove• ths claimant's innocence of th& crime ha waa 
I • 
convicted of, as - wel!l · as · any . laaaar · included· otfenaaa. DY a · 
preponderance ·of the ~vidance." The trial· court · dete:z:m:ined· that 
Cotton waa engaqed in criminal activity -at the time of his ·arrest·. · 
.. 
• ._,;_ jt I 
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I. THE DECISION OF THE COMMON PLEAS COtJRT TO 
REFUSE TO !DECLARE THE PLAINTIFF A WRONGFULLY 
IMPRISONED! PERSON IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND 
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
II. THE COURT I ERR.ED IN NOT GIVING PRECLUSIVE. 
EFFECT INI 'l'HE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OP' 
APPEALS. 
III. THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN NOT 
GRANTING SUldMARY JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff Cotton contends that because his conviction for 
receiving stolen proper~y was reversed by this Court, it follows 
that he wae wronqful~ imprisoned, as a matter of law, and entitled 
to compensation. We ldisaqree. 
In 1986, the Ohio . Laqislature enacted R.~C • . 2305.02 wh,j,ch 
i 
qranted jUl:iadiction Ito Courts of Common Pleas to determine whether 
I . 
I 
or not a person has1 bean wrongfully impriaoned as the term is 
I 
I 
defined in R. c. 2743.48. 
I 
I 
R.C. 2743.48(.A) (\1)-(5) provides in pertinent part, ae follows1 
(A) · As used in this section, a "wronqfully 
impriaoned lindividual" means an individual who 
satiatied- each of the followings . · 
I ( 1) He was charq&d with a violation. of a 
section of ltha Revised Code by an indictment 
or in:tormation prior to, or on · ·or ·after, 
September 24, 1986, and the violation charged 
wa& an aq~avated felony · or felony. 
(2) He.was ifound guilty of, but did not ·plead 
quil ty to, ithe particula:i: charge of a lali&er-
... ~ "11 ... "11 I "' .., ... , I •> I 
included :otfenslil 
involved, : and the 
found guilty wae 
felony. ! 
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by the court or jury 
offense of which he was 
an ag.qravated . felony or 
( 3) He we sentenced to an indefinite or 
definite t'u:m of imprisonment in a state pan.al 
or reformatory institution for the offense of 
which he was found guilty. 
I 
' I 
(4) Tha individual'8 conviction was vacated or 
was dismissed, or reversed on appeal, the 
proaec:utinq attorney in th• ·case cannot or 
will not seak any further appeal of riqht or 
upon leave of court, and no criminal 
proceeding jis pending, can be brouqht, or will 
be brought I by any p.rosecutinq attorney, city 
di.rector of law, villaqe solicitor, or other 
chief legal! officer of a municipal corporation 
aqainat the individual for any act as•ociated 
with that conviction. 
(5) Subs~nt to his sentencing and during or 
subsequent I to his imprisonment, if was 
determined by a court of common. plea• · thilt the 
offense of which he was found guilty, 
including ail lesser-included~offenses, either 
was not committed by him or was not committed 
by any person. 
' 
'. \ .. • I 
In Walden v. Stade (1989), 47 Ohio St.Jd 47, the Supreme Court 
hQld that in a proceeding for wronqful imprisonment under R.C. 
I 
230~.02, th• claiman~ bears the burden of provinq innocence by a 
preponderance of th~ evidence not simply aa a result of an 
i 
acquittal or reversal\ of a conviction in the underlying .criminal 
I 
case. "In enactinq sJct.ion 2305.0~, the General Aa•embly intended 
I· 
th.At the court of Common Plecus ·actively · separate .. thoae- who were 
wrongfully imprisoned l from those who . have merely avoided criminal I . . . 
liability." Id• at 52. Since the· State is unable to appeal a 
final verdict· in a criminal case, the issue ot whether or not the 
I 
I 
' ~ C: I ~ I D T • f'l I I vr\llC: I -.lt:.11c:. , " - I ...,, - , .,,, - .;; .,J I .,; ' """' ' 11 I • - I .,, ..,. ..,. .. I Y.., • I"" • " 
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plaintiff was trulx an innocent peraon is another raaaon for 
deterinining wronqfuJl. imprisonment by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Id. "Claimants . seeking compensation for •ronqful 
I 
imprisonment must prpve that at the time of the incident for which 
they were initially 1charqed, they wer~ not· engaging in any other 
criminal conduct ar~sinq out of the incident for which they were 
initially charged." ~ Gover v. State ( 1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 93, 
ayllabus. 
So it is that : the Walden Court held that wh•re a person 
claiming compansatidn for wrongful imprisonment has obtained a 
judQ:mmlt: ot acqu.t.tUf, ,_udgme11.t J.a .. no.t.: ~ -~~ !11'~~~ f 
•U..C.t .. in.-&.· p:o~g under R.C. 2305.02 ... .. W&ldea<;.,..~a~it..,.., 
of ·~yllabus. we· tinb. the same pri.ncipla should apply whether he · 
I 
was acquitted at trial or, as here, the conviction was reversed on 
' 
appeal. Chandler v. IState (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 142; see, ai,~o. 
Mueller v. state (Dec. 12, 1988), Warren App. No. CABB-05-037, 
unreported. ! 
i 
This Court in state v. cotton, No. 56775 at paqe 10: 
••• the evidence infers that appellant waa 
qtlilt:y of tina.uthorized use of a vehicle. R.C. 
2913.03. ! Stats v. Boyce (1986), 33 Ohio 
App, 2d 2 9 5. However, appellant was not 
charged wit.h that offense. - ~; .. 
Since this court! haa .. praviouely acknowledged -that the evidence 
I 
permitted .inf~rence olf Cotton's culpability unde-r a · les1ar incl~· 
I 
of fenae., there was ~uf ficient evidence to over-come plaintiff• i!I 
• 
! ~t; I ~ I 0 I •" I I v l\11C:. 1 -..C:. 1 1C:. I\"~ I .., - J. W - Q \,,I I W ' .., v ' 1•) I 
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I 
I 
claim thAt the offense charged "was not committed by him or was not 
! 
commJ.tt&d by any perll!On." Sea R.C. 2743.48(A) (S). 
The interancaa Jawn from all of the evidence be:tore th• court 
established ~he plaiJ tiff's culpabilitya (1) ha was workinq on 
I 
cars with peeled steering columns and chanqed VIN plates: (2) he 
. . I 
waa underneath the waled column of the gray Cadillac when the 
I 
police arrived on th, scene and found him workinq on the coiumn: 
(3) ~oola were acatte~ed about the a.raa where Cotton waa working I . 
and three stolen ve!UJclas were situated. It does not take much 
I 
imagination to conclu~e that Cotton was engaged in some kind ot 
illegal conduct whetru:lr or not the State failed to prove it beyond 
a raaaonable doubt. I 
Tha totality ot the circumstances must b• considered in a case 
. i 
such as this, There ras sufficient evidence, if bali~ved by the 
triAl court, to eatabll.iah that defendant was not truly innocent . , 
. i :- ' . - ! : ··--· . 
and was wrongfully incarcerated a• a pure victim of circumstance•. I . 
There was sufficient Jidance in the record to show that appellant 
or soma other person are enqaged in criminal conduct in working 
on the peelad staerin columns of stolen vehiclsa. 
These assignments of error are overruled • 
. IV . .. . THE COMHON PLEAS COURT FAILED . - TO . GRANT 
JUDGMENT TO THE PLAINTIFP BECAUSE THE REQUEST 
- FOR ADMISSIONS WAS NOT~ PROPERLY ANSWERED. 
. I 
Thi.a aasiqnment o~ error is without m•rit. The x:aciord raveala . 
I . 
that. the State provide~ the plainti:U with a timely reaponae.. to ..,_i.s .. . 
discovar;y . requfiUlt. Hah th• pla..intiff been · dicsa.tiafied .. ,,.ith _ the ~. 
., 
• 
..., ..., ,, • .., , •r..11 ... 1 H\ - • "'-1•- ·,r· -
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response, he should ava filed a motion to. compel pur•uant to Civ. 
R. 37, which was not done. 
P'rom th~ recor; and trial briefs below, this iasua was not 
raised or otherwise i rouqbt to the court's attention. We will not 
address an aeeignmej t of error not raised in the trial court. 
Lakevood v. All Struetures, Inc. (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 115: State 
v. Williams (1977), ~ l Ohio St.2d 112, 117. See, also, State ex 
rel. Athens Cty. De~t. of Human Serv. v. ifol:f (1991), 77 Ohio 
App.3d 619, 622. 
Assignment of Etror IV is ovarrulAd. 
V. THE COURT OMMITTED PRE.JUDICIAL ERROR IN NOT 
TRANSP'!RRIBG THIS CASE TO THE JUDGE WHO 
CONDUCTED ~ CRIMINAL CASE. 
The plaintiff f~led a motion to transfer this case from Judge 
MdGinty ' s docket to hat of Judge Burt w. Griffin for the reason 
tha~ Jud~~ Griffin ha presided at tha criminal tr~al involving '.t~ 
plaintiff. 
tranafer of 
plaintiff cites n~ authority requirinq the 
caae to th• oriqinal trial judge. <~;ilisia\ttll 
~o;r·· · _, .. < 
"~-~~alti~··~··c:t· l.Ul111:8nt. 
Superintendence . . Rule. . 4 ia:.: :>JDispl,aced• .. 
superintendence Rule 4 pJ:OVid•• . for a .system. of asai<Jninq .casea.;: 
where~y: a .c:u.5& is a••iqnad by chance to. a judge 0£ the .. court who 
..• ,. 
• 
~ 
'l >Jl:I~ 1 O l •,... , 1 v •'\ "I: • l.lt:m:;r\,...._ 1 .., - '"w - Y oJ I '11 ' .., Ir ·11 I 
- ll -
becomes primarily responsible fer the determination of that case. 
The scope of the rul~ did not compel the assignment of Cotton's 
civil case to . Judqe G if fin. The purpose of the rule is to prevent 
the forum shoppinq f judqe&. Cotton's requeat to have Judge 
Griffin hear his civi case goes aqainst the intent and purpose of 
Superintendance Rule t· 
A8aiqnment of Erkor V is overruled. 
I 
Judgment affirmed. 
I 
I 
•I .:J~ l i I 
• 
. '· 
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It is ordered ~hat appellae recover of appellant its costs 
I 
herein taxed. 1 
I 
The Court find• \there were reasonable ground• for this appeal. 
It is ord•red trat a special mandate iaaue out of this Court 
directing the Court \of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into 
execution. 
A certified copr of this ent:ry shall constitute the mandate 
I 
purauant to Rule 27 bf the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
• c 
RECEIVED FOR FILING 
JAMES D. SHEENEY. P.J., and 
I 
O'DONNELL, J .. CONCtJR. 
i 
I 
·· \ : 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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N.B. Thi• entry is Eade pursuant to the third sentence of Rule 
22(0), Ohio Rules of ppellate Procedure. This is an announcement 
of d9cision (see Rul 26). Tan (10) days from the date hereof, 
thia document will be l sta.mped to ina1ca~e journalization, at which 
time it will become ~he judgment and order of the court and time 
period for review willl begin to run. 
